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Most of our lives takes place on-line. Our on-line activities, affect directly or indi-
rectly the way other people perceive us. One have to careful decide what to expose
and what not. There are a lot of personal and sensitive information that people
could unintentionally disclose.
Indeed an enormous amount of data is being generated and can be disclosed by
an increasing number of people on the Web, often without know who is recording
what about them. The odds of being tracked without full acknowledge is growing
mainly because of two reasons: the exorbitant number of company in the behavioral
advertising field and a market overfilled with free services to attract users.
This thesis focus on the study of the value of privacy, as intended by people. Learn-
ing the value of privacy is of great importance. How people value their own privacy
affects the way relationships among individuals are created and maintained. Not
only, it have implications on how an individual relates himself with the world, it
influences user behaviors and attitudes.
The mechanisms responsible for how people value their own privacy are bounded to
the perception of risks and perceived level of fairness of the outside world. That com-
ponent is the awareness. The way an individual perceives the risks around him/her,
represent one of the big challenge in order to fully understand the way people value
their privacy. A better understand of those mechanisms and an increased awareness
will help to design and build privacy by design systems.
Increased awareness can help users to understand how and why their privacy is
mined, and to become more informed about what silently happens during their nav-
igation. Learning from disclosure of personal information may help to discriminate
potential harmful activities from daily and regular activities that can be performed.
Awareness could help people to make informed decision about privacy online, and
adopt countermeasures if necessary. Protecting users on-line from privacy risks is a
difficult task. Task made even more difficult by users’ attitudes. Users are not fully
aware of the risks of privacy leaks, even after the increasingly number of press reports
about privacy leakage and personal information disclosure on the Web. They ignore
that their data can be collected, aggregated and linked with ambient information
for various purposes.
Anyway, even if awareness is not the only mechanism involved in evaluating privacy,
it can be used to study if a privacy tool can help users to make informed decision
to reduce their exposure while on the Web. To this aim, we conducted a study to
analyze general perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about privacy online, with a focus
on the mutual influence with users skills.
We discovered mechanisms responsible for how a person value its own privacy: a)
skills influence the perception of privacy risks b) privacy is worth the price if it is a
3
side effect of another well-recognized benefit.
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The discussions of privacy is a very old topic. It is a topic that get renowned each
time there is a technological shift. Its fame is proportional to the impact of the
technological shift. Every new technological advance of the society have an impact
on the lives of every individual. They change multiple aspects of our lives, how we
perceive the world, how we spent our time, even our wellness.
Most of all, technologies aims at make life easier and more enjoyable. But every
time our lives are shaken by the introduction of new technologies, new concerns arise
about the consequences of this introduction.
When photography was first introduced in newspapers, people were concerned
about potential privacy violations that could happen due to the publication of photos
that violate the privacy of an individual. This problem was so prominent that an
attorney and a lawyer at the end of the 19th century coined one of the most well-
know definition of privacy, because of the problems due to the new technology.
In the last twenty years the exponential growth of Internet, Web and computers
diffusion created an environment where people can connect to each other and com-
municate. Companies offer services on the Internet, open online store to sell their
merchandise, create innovative way to communicate with the rest of the world.
This technology have an huge impact on our lives. A good piece of our lives is
spent online. We create an image of ourself, motivated by our desire to keep in
touch, a sort of digital projection that depict us online and available to whoever
want to know us better.
This digital picture of ourself can be less or more detailed. It can be just an email,
a Web page (personal or institutional), or an Online Social Network (OSN) account,
and several others. In a world so connected, social and open, an even increasing
number of individual are being exposed to an enormous amount of information,
online services, and new way to communicate and co-operate with each other.
With this profound shift in our lives, concerns about possible privacy violation
arise again. People nowadays communicate with email, SMS, messages on OSN
(Facebook, Twitter), and use several online services to search for subject of interests,
read a newspaper, find a restaurant, plan a trip for holiday or work, check their
savings at their bank, buy some goods, and discuss health problems. The list of
such activities is never ending and includes very sensitive topic (health problems).
Given the enormous impact of this technologies on our lives, a question arise about
what privacy actually mean in our days.
Various meaning of privacy exists, one of the most used, and old definition, is the
one given by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis: “Privacy is the right to be
let alone” [80], back to 1890. At the time, journalists started to use photography
in newspapers, leading to concerns about possible privacy intrusion due to photos.
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Similar to that, privacy is also defined as the right to prevent the disclosure of per-
sonal information [81]. Another definition for privacy is the ability of an individual
to control the terms under which his/her personal information are acquired and
used [22]. Privacy definitions are very sensible to context, as it can be argued from
this definition too: “Individuals have privacy to the extent that others have limited
access to information about them, to the intimacies of their lives, to their thoughts
or their bodies” [68].
Recently a group of researcher [84] from the Faculty of Law from the University
of Haifa, gave this definition:
The right to privacy is our right to keep a domain around us, which
includes all those things that are part of us, such as our body, home,
property, thoughts, feelings, secrets and identity. The right to privacy
gives us the ability to choose which parts in this domain can be accessed
by others, and to control the extent, manner and timing of the use of
those parts we choose to disclose.
The key point in all these definition is the "ability to choose", the capability for
a person to control how their information can be accessed by other individuals and
entities. Today, with all the advances in technologies, is hard to be able to control
how one own personal information are disseminated and used.
The value of privacy, specially in our days, is of great importance. And its rele-
vance has been deeply analyzed by Acquisti et al. [3]. Companies have huge interests
in understanding the value of privacy and how people value their privacy. The main
reason is that understand how people value their privacy, will help them to design
their services in order to make their users feels comfortable while using them.
Moreover companies have interests to know how people value their privacy, be-
cause showing that the company do care about its own users’ privacy, create a good
image and make the company more attractive. It can result in a huge advantage
respect their competitors.
The reasons to study the value of privacy are not limited to only economics ones.
It has great resonance for legal communities and for policy makers. Legal experts
and jurists study the problems of privacy in everyday life, what does it means in
our days, and how the society should regulate privacy questions and protect citizens
privacy. Moreover judiciary are making a big effort to understand the value of
privacy in our time, and adapt the laws to fits the needs of the modern society.
This work is needed because there is no explicit reference to privacy protection,
in the constitution of several big countries. There is no explicit reference to privacy
protection or right in the American constitution, or in the European Community.
Few country have a constitution that explicit talk about privacy or have specific laws
about it, like Brazil, Canada and Australia. Therefore a better understand of the
value of privacy would help to improve both the legislation and lawmaking process,
and regulate the way private information of an individual can be accessed.
Without a proper regulation, privacy of individuals can be at risks, personal and
sensitive information can be accessed by third party entities without consent. Privacy
violation can have different nature: illegal activities as identity thefts [8, 13, 67], or
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for fall under the National Security jurisdiction1 or for behavioral/target advertising.
Privacy incursions can be analyzed regardless of the motivation for which they
happen. Indeed, in a taxonomy of privacy violations [70] four groups of activities
have been recognized as harmful for both daily life and online privacy of individ-
uals. The first group, “Information Collection”, includes all activities related to
surveillance, that is: watching, listening to, or recording of an individuals’ activ-
ities. The second group of activities, “Information Processing”, involves the way
information is stored, aggregated, linked and used. Aggregation (i.e, combination
of various pieces of data about a person), identification (i.e., linking information
about specific people) and secondary use (i.e., information collected for a specific
purpose and maliciously used for different purposes) represent the potential harms
of this group of activities. The third group of activities,“Information Dissemina-
tion”, involves the dissemination of collected information through, as an example,
the disclosure of both sensitive and personally identifiable information, while the
final group, “Invasion”, involves invasions into people’s private affairs.
Because we cannot know how collected data about users are effectively used, we
focus on the first groups of activities. One of the major reason for user track-
ing, and an interrupted demand for large amount of individual information, is the
behavioral advertising practice. The practice increases the effectiveness of the mar-
keter’s campaigns2. But at the same time it also gives rise to privacy concerns since
private information may be collected and centralized by a limited number of com-
panies [18], sometimes referred as Aggregators. The situation has been exacerbated
through the introduction of the aforementioned free popular services, such as Online
Social Networks (OSN), in order to extend the ability of advertising companies to
deliver targeted advertising. Users effectively pay for these free services through
micro payments of ever-greater amounts of personal information.
Numerous free services came up in the last years, creating an environment where
people can unconsciously disclose personal and sensitive information.
Nowadays people using these service, likely give them personal information in
exchange for the service itself, for customization, or just to have their data always
available, across all of their devices3 (i.e. cloud services). Moreover privacy policy
of these services are rarely4 read and, when read, not well understood. But they
do influence user, as Stutzman et al show in their work [74]. They find that users
who report to have read more of a site’s privacy policy tend to disclose less. An
interesting study on behavior [32] show that only a small percentages of users read
the privacy policy of Web Sites and, in general, most of the users are not able to
reliable understand their content [10, 54], by exhibiting a little willingness to adopt
privacy protective technologies [2]. The main reason is attributed to users, that find
learning about privacy and reading privacy policies difficult and time consuming.
Because of this apparently apathy of users for privacy, several companies are
collecting an enormous amount of data about users on the Web. On top of that, all
1 WashingtonPost - NSA Infiltrates links to Yahoo and Google
2Targeted advertising is more than twice as effective as non-targeted ads [9]
3http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/how-far-do-google-drives-terms-go-in-owning-your-files/75228
4Less than one out of four users claims to have read Facebook’s privacy policy [5].
15
1 Introduction
the data gained by third party entities are used in ways that are not always known.
Numerous press report have been published about privacy scandals or misuses
of users data. One of the most famous case of misuses of users’ data is the AOL
Search Leak case. In the 2006 AOL released a file for research purpose, containing
20 million search keywords used by more than 600,000 of their users. The file was
made anonymous, but personally identifiable information were still available in many
searches. Thank to that, it was easy to identify an individual with their associated
search history, like the user 44177495.
The famous social network Facebook have been trough a lot of privacy problems
too. One of them regards several of their popular applications (so called Apps).
Apps are software made by other independent company or individuals available
through Facebook. The Wall Street Journal made an astonishing discover in one
of their article from the series "What They Know". They find out that several
Facebook Apps sent the Facebook ID to third party companies (advertising and
tracking company). Note that the transmission of this information was not bounded
by privacy settings. Although it did not seems serious, it has to be stated that the
Facebook ID is a string that uniquely identify a user. When the ID is available,
discover the first name and last name of an individual became a trivial task. It is
as simple as open a Web browser, go to Facebook and append the ID to the URL.
This procedure works even if the user associated with the ID have all of his/her
information set to private. It affected every profile that uses the application in
question. While the ID alone do not grant any access to private information, it
uniquely identify the person, allowing a third party to profile a user and associate a
name, surname ant potentially other information to it (including a picture), leading
to serious concerns about privacy of individuals.
At the time of the investigation, they found out that the 10 most popular Apps
on Facebook, were transmitting users’ ID to outside companies. Some of them even
transmit personal information about user’s friends.
What happen clearly show that companies that do even partial tracking, can easily
associate a real person to a profile. The risks of misuses or leak of information is
not to be underestimated.
Interestingly, given the enormous amount of press reports about privacy problems
and the severity of the problems reported, users seems to not care about it.
Unfortunately, this apparently inconsistency does not help to clarify whenever
users are really worried for their privacy and how they value it. Studying the way
users value their privacy, one prominent mechanism is related to the perception of
fairness of the outside world. If there is trust between an individual and a company,
one is not worried to disclose personal information. Unfortunately most of the time
people give trust on false basis or without enough information to make an informed
decision.
Numerous studies show that people do not value their privacy, while they are
still concerned about it. People are sometimes scared of being online, or open an
e-commerce for privacy related concerns, but are more than pleasant to freely share




An interesting argumentation comes from Odlyzko [58], he introduce the afore-
mentioned contradiction on privacy, arguing that the main responsible for it relies
in the benefits of price discrimination6. Price discrimination is a largely adopted
pricing strategy, used for more than two century, that increases revenue by allowing
new transactions that otherwise would not take place. The main idea is to sell the
same service to different people at different price. The price is proportional to the
willingness to pay of customers.
The public dislike of price discrimination provides incentive to hide it
This relationship has contributed to the increase of privacy violation and intrusion,
because privacy intrusion helps to improve price discrimination without trigger rag-
ing comments from the government or associations. Profile and categorize users
favor the partition of the market, helping to apply a price discrimination strategy.
The so called "free" services are offered in exchange of micro-payments in personal
information.
Another interesting hint on how people value their privacy come from the exper-
iments done in numerous store7. Famous brand are testing technologies to track
customers inside their store. All the experiments aim at obtain information on
customers behaviors. They track customers by monitoring them with several tech-
nologies: a) using the Wi-Fi signal of their smartphones b) smart cameras that can
tell the mood of the customers and what goods they were looking at c) special mo-
bile App of the store. They aim at understand how much time customers spend in
each sections of the store or how long they look at merchandise before buying it.
The goal is to use these information to decide how to change the store layouts, or
use them to give customized coupons. It is not different from what an e-commerce
site actually does in order to propose goods that a specific client could find inter-
esting. But when the employees posted a sign telling customers that the store was
tracking them, shoppers were frightened and discouraged to continue shopping.
While people seems to not care about privacy, tracking and profiling online, they
do care about it when they know that someone is watching over them. Only a
few manifested their desire to happily trade some of their private information for a
coupon. The experiment conducted by Beresford [11] reveals that when a person is
faced with a request for personal data in exchange for a cheaper price or a coupon,
they do actual choice to give their data.
Unfortunately this exchange is not always transparent, therefore the importance
of awareness and its influence on how people value their privacy, is not to be under-
estimated. An exhaustive knowledge of the extent of privacy leakage and a better
understand of the mechanisms that guide people to value their privacy are the goal
at which we aims.
As for the definition of privacy, the definition of privacy awareness is not well
established in the literature, too. Anyway, privacy awareness of an individual should





1.1 Extend of privacy leakage
• Who is is tracking, receiving or collecting his/her information
• When information is collected
• Which information other entities receive, store and improperly use
• How pieces of information is processed, linked and aggregated to build detailed
profiles
• What amount of 3rd party objects can undermine users’ privacy on the Web
In general, users do not have perception of all the aforementioned information.
Users are someway aware that their activities are largely monitored by third party
entities, but they are absolutely not aware of which data is disclosed to them, and
how those data may be used to derive their identity.
As a matter of fact, both awareness and full control are considered very impor-
tant requirements as recommended by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) [20],
the Privacy Right Clearinghouse (PRC) [62] and other important privacy watchdog
organizations.
In order to protect their privacy, users need to be, “in primis”, educated about the
existing and emerging tracking mechanisms used by third party sites and next, they
have to be informed about which pieces of information is disseminated, collected
and aggregated, to build consistent and truthful dossiers about them. This knowl-
edge will contribute to increase user awareness about the dangerousness of certain
activities that are increasingly airily performed on the Web, or at least, make people
aware of the wide range of used tracking mechanisms and of their risks for privacy,
leaving them at the same time, the full control over their own personal data and on
their resultant behaviors.
1.1 Extend of privacy leakage
As stated before, given the high value of users information, in online communication,
is important to give to users the concrete possibility of enhancing their privacy.
Nowadays, increasing amounts of both personally identifiable information (PII) and
sensitive (e.g., medical, financial and family) information continue to be leaked to
third party entities [39,41,49].
Privacy can be undermined by third parties [21]. They intervene as uninvited
guests during common online activities such as: Web searches, online shopping,
online business and financial transactions, social activities and during any type of
communications on the Web. However, the real risk is about the final use of these
pseudo-anonymous data, that linked with personally identifiable information (i.e.,
phone number, credit card number, social security number and so on), may be
disclosed or explicitly sold to third party entities. There exists companies (data-
brokering companies) that collect, aggregate, link data and sells users profiles as
their core business8. There have been action on the opposite side too, for example
8http://www.propublica.org/article/yes-companies-are-harvesting-and-selling-your-social-media-
profiles. Sometimes even Internet Service Provider have sold their customer click-stream9
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abine.com created and offers a service to remove own data across several aggrega-
tors10.
Even pseudo-anonymous data collected and linked with PII such as email ad-
dresses and credit card number, may be sold by aggregators. The possessors of such
data may use it for identity theft, social engineering attacks, online and physical
stalking and so on11 [24, 30, 42, 61]. On social network sites, individual continually
share personal data, without being aware of how their information can be accessed.
Liu et al [44] conduct an experiment to test if Facebook users are aware of how effec-
tive their privacy settings are. They find that almost three user out of four believe
that their settings were more restrictive. They show a significant gap between the
desired privacy settings and the actual privacy settings.
It would be useful to be able to measure the privacy lost. Unfortunately, pri-
vacy is usually a hard thing to measure, especially since it’s hard even for users
themselves to quantify. For example, photos alone are likely to have wildly varying
privacy requirements, depending on who is in the photo, where it was taken, etc.
Moreover, because very little is known about procedure and use of these data inside
the companies, an accurate measure of what is the extent of privacy problem is not
possible.
Some researcher in thsi field aimed at design mechanisms to clearly show this
hidden transaction of personal information. Several solution to the problem have
been proposed, but no one was adopted. In particular Riederer et al [64] propose a
new mechanism called transactional privacy, that aims to reach a fully transparent
transaction, where all the parties are aware of what is going on. Users control which
information is released, and what is its price. Aggregators, instead, purchase these
information to serve personalized ads to users. This idea, and other similar have
been used in several context. Leontiadis et al [43] propose a similar idea for the
advertising market on mobile devices.
Unfortunately those mechanisms are not enough attractive for companies operat-
ing in the market, that do not adopt them.
There are few points that were not investigated in depth in literature, that will
be discussed here
The extent of privacy incursion in online activities Although numerous study have
proved that personal and sensitive information are leaked to 3rd party sites [39,
41], there are aspects not investigated in depth.
Analysis of the online privacy threats, categorization and classification During these
studies, online privacy threats are classified based on their nature, and ordered
by their usage. Furthermore we design a hierarchy of the most important pri-
vacy threats analyzing the ways in which personal and sensitive information
are sent to third party sites.
Study of information trading between aggregators The daisy chaining is a well-




1.2 Behaviors, perceptions and concerns
But there is no information on the extent of its usage. We studied leakages
that may occur via communications among them.
Extend of privacy leakage, and aggregators capabilities In order to show how far
the extent of privacy leakage is, we study if it possible to identify a user. We
study if it is possible to derive its interests and browsing habits, by linking
bits of personal information leaked towards different third party sites. Specif-
ically we examined what fraction of a user’s profile is available to the different
aggregators.
Effectiveness of Privacy Enhancing Tools A study of the tools available to protect
privacy, a comparison between them on performance, effectiveness and efficacy.
We derive an ordering of the importance of existing tools according to the
countermeasures they provide and their effectiveness in limiting the disclosures
of important information. The order is based on the hierarchy of privacy
threats.
1.2 Behaviors, perceptions and concerns
While it seems that user do not care for privacy, other statistics show that 63% of
users agreed with a statement of concern for third party monitoring activities [83].
Moreover, Krishnamurthy et al., in another study, emphasize how critical is the
situation showing that 56% of sites analyzed (75% when considering userids) directly
leak sensitive and identifiable information to third party aggregators [39]. User
are worried of disclosure of personal information to third party sites without their
permissions. This represents the greatest concern among them, that demand more
control over the disclosure of their personal data and more effective solutions to
protect themselves.
To be able to help users to make informed decision, a better understanding of how
they value their privacy is needed. Two aspects have to be considered:
• Individuals have different thoughts and beliefs, with behaviors that change
according to environmental and personal factors or user’s orientation [25].
• Individuals are torn between the desire for privacy and the desire for personal
communication with others [37].
We verify the impact of awareness on users, considering several factor. We expose
users to the leakage of their personal and sensitive information, and see their reac-
tion. One interesting question is to verify if, by seeing the leakage, they would take
steps to protect themselves.
To let users face the privacy leakage of their data, we make them use a tool that
shows leaked data named NoTrace [46–48]. For the experiment we recruited students
from University.
We study whether their skills influence attitudes toward privacy, privacy-related
behavioral intentions and actual behaviors, and whether awareness and learning
from own behavior may increase the willingness of people to limit the diffusion of
20
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personal information and protect their privacy while they are navigating the Web.
The study, focus on two subgroups of students, with different skills. The students
were surveyed about:
1. General understanding of privacy concerns about online activities.
2. Skills and attitudes toward privacy and behavior.
3. Willingness to limit the diffusion of their personal information
Overall, we want to evaluate whether the skilled Group would have more concerns
about privacy when compared with the non-skilled Group and if the skills can influ-
ence the perception of the risks about privacy, as well as the corresponding privacy
behaviors. We want also to evaluate whether awareness about information leakage






Many researcher have focused their attention on issues related to privacy online.
The literature is plenty of works about privacy problem, starting from the simple
analysis of potential privacy issues to extended discussions. A big effort has been
done to understand the dichotomy of users apparently concerned about privacy.
Castelluccia [18] demonstrate how real are the privacy problems due to behavioral
advertising. They show a simple algorithm to derive user profile and interest starting
from only the customized advertising a user receive.
Several researcher have proposed mechanisms that could help to mitigate or solve
the problem. Because there is no possibility to intervene in the processes that
take place inside the aggregators, the only concrete way to proceed is to prevent
information leakage. Every concrete solution, is based on this approach. There are
client-side tools and technologies, that aims at preventing information leakage. Most
of the time they are browser extension that help users to limit the diffusion of their
personal and sensitive information.
This approach, deployed client-side, is obviously limited because it cannot manage
what happen once an aggregator have these data. Anyway the proposed solutions
are not limited to this approach. Other solutions aims at solve the problem at its
core. Other studies focus on the creation of mechanisms that will not unsettle the
current economic market, while improving the privacy. Some other studies, instead,
aims at find mechanisms that just make the process of the economic market more
transparent, so that user could make informed decision while on the Web. Anyway,
as stated before, those kind of solutions are not really adopted. Till today, users
can only be helped in preventing information leakage. Therefore the analysis focus
on client-side tools.
To help users protect themselves, numerous studies aims at resolve, or at least to
achieve a better understand of the Privacy Paradox Problem.
Norberg et al. [57] analyze the dichotomy of privacy, discussing advantages and
disadvantages of having a legislation that protect users’ privacy while the users
willingly disclose personal information. Because despite protestations of users, they
are the conduits of their information leakage. Rosemberg [65], among the others,
state that the most effective way to control the use of users’ information is to prevent
it from ever coming into other hands.
Furthermore, from a policy maker’s perspective, it is weird to protect users from
their own chosen behaviors. Therefore the response is to give them more conscious-
ness about what goes underground while on the Web, in such a way that they are




All the studies that aim at quantify the extent of privacy leakage, usually relay
on experiments done client-side. Most of the time the data are obtained using a
Proxy/Sniffer. There are several tools available for this goal: MITMProxy1 , Bro2 ,
LiveHTTPHeader3 , etc.
Studies on the extent of privacy leakage usually use a methodology called “surface
crawling”. That is a visit to the home page of the Web sites without following other
links. This technique is mostly used to derive an order of the top used threats for
privacy.
Indeed the UC Berkeley Center for Law and Technology4, recently conducted a
research to quantify vectors for tracking individuals on the Web. They find that
the top 100 Web site dropped thousands of cookies, and that 84.7% of them were
third-party cookies. They also find that Flash cookies are still used, but their use is
declining among the most popular Web sites in favor of HTML5 LocalStorage.
This methodology lacks an important factor, it does not take into account the
human interaction that take place on Web sites (e.g. adding items to a shopping
cart, comment on an item) and did not follow links set by JavaScript code in response
to users interaction. But most of all this approach do not maintain an identity across
all the visited Web sites, because it does not login on any of them.
Other work do not focus on privacy threats, but on the study of concrete privacy
leakage. Krishnamurthy et al. [41] during a study that lasted few years and involved
more than 1,000 Web sites, made several interesting findings:
• The tracking activities have grown from 40% to 70% in few years (Oct’05 -
Sep’08).
• Now only few families account for more than 75% of the tracking, due to
companies acquisition.
In another study Krishnamurthy et al. [39] build a dataset composed by the top-
100 Web site from 12 Alexa categories and sub-categories. They simulate user
interaction by using a surface crawl, opening each one of the Web site, and login on
them. They trace everything using one of the tools briefly described at the beginning
of the section. Their results show that 56% of the Web sites in their dataset directly
leaked pieces of private information to third party aggregators.
The major vectors of threats for privacy remains constant, their popularity vary.
The only exception is the threats that come from technologies for local storage on
the Web browser. In the last 5 years there was a technological shift from Flash
Cookies to HTML LocalStorage. But while Flash Cookies use is decreasing in favor
of HTML5 Localstorage, they are still used [53]. Furthermore there are insight of
leakage presented in a study [7] where authors showed Web sites that had HTML5







Several technologies have been developed to give users the concrete possibility to
protect their privacy when they are online. Most of them are stand-alone programs
or extension of Web browser. The most famous one is AdBlock Plus [60] that
realize the canonical filtering mechanism of blacklist and whitelist. The tool is
designed to use crowd-sourcing to be useful for several purpose: blocking advertising,
blocking tracking objects, enhance privacy, etc. Indeed there is a rich group of people
working on lists’ definition for every need. Anyway, AdBlock was design to block
advertisements, and not as a tool for improving privacy online.
Instead, RequestPolicy [66] and Ghostery [28] were explicitly designed with the
privacy implications of third party requests in mind. The former was meant to give
the users the full control over communication between Web site and third party
domain. Its mechanism is as simple as genial. For each domain, the user can chose
with which other domains it can communicate (third part request) and with which
not. This mechanism is powerful and help users to protect themselves, but have two
main drawback: 1) It assume that a user know, or is willing to learn, which domains
are malicious 2) It need a different tuning for each user. The latter focus on privacy,
and give to users the control over the third party request, requests directed to a
specific domain can be blocked. Instead NoScript [50] was meant to be a security
tool, to prevent execution of third party (in general unwanted) JavaSript code inside
the Web browser.
Other browser extension focus on specific threats, like RefControl5 that filter out
only the Referer header of HTTP request. Another example is Milk, a browser
extension that alter the HTTP request/response and rewrites the HTTP cookies to
strictly bind them to the first-party domains from which they were set [79].
Moreover for all these tools, there is no experiments to assert, correctness, effec-
tiveness, or performance.6
Furthermore, a list of important requirements [63] that tools for privacy protection
should exhibit was drawn up to better classify tools.
• Measure privacy attitude of people, gathering, for example preferences
from observations of their behaviors. It is important to highlight that this
practice should be not privacy-invasive and should involve a clear consciousness
in the analyzed individuals.
• No invasion to privacy itself avoiding interruptions that may annoy users
and and leading them to relinquish the used tools.
• Understandable for target group by presenting data to users in a way
that they are able to handle it cognitively.
• Tailored to the specific situations and users by presenting information
to users in a way that they are able to understand according to expertise.
5http://www.stardrifter.org/refcontrol/
6Regarding performance aspect, only a simple experiment of correctness and impact on Web sites
has been presented for RequestPolicy [66].
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• Offer support, no assumption of responsibility helping users to make
informed decisions.
• Performance and Effectiveness in order to make the tools longer used by
users since excessive delays involve an abandonment by users after first use [26].
Again, one of the key point is to give users the capabilities to make informed
decision, goal that could be achieved improving privacy awareness. Most of the
work reported in the literature address the problem of privacy awareness only from
the point of view of the availability of privacy policies on the Web sites [36]. In
addition, in spite of the concerns about risks connected to their privacy, only few
users are really aware of what happens behind the scene. Regarding Facebook, for
instance, users put more trust in the service provider than in average Facebook
users [5]. More than half of the users (56%) believes that Facebook does not share
personal information with third parties and 70% believe that Facebook does not
combine information about them collected from other sources. Less than one out of
four users claims to have read Facebook’s privacy policy.
There are preliminary work on tool effectiveness too. In a study of 2012 [51], the
authors used the FourthParty Web measurement platform7 to study the effectiveness
of 11 blocking tools. Their dataset was obtained from three consecutive crawls of the
Alexa U.S. top-500. The results of the experiments is that the most effective tool
in blocking tracking activities is a combination of several community-maintained
blocklists. The goal was to find the most effective tool that mitigate the tracking,
with no regards to personal and sensitive information leakage.
2.2 Behavior and concerns and perceptions
There are works focused on users’ behaviors, concerns and perceptions of risks. Some
of these works studied the behavior of users on Online Social Network, like Facebook.
Most of the users think that their privacy is not at risk. They trust the companies.
Acquisti et al. [5] demonstrate that only few users are really aware of what happens
behind the curtains. Furthermore Facebook users put more trust in the service
provider than in the average Facebook user, as already stated. More importantly,
half of users believes that Facebook does not share personal information with third
parties and 70% believe that Facebook does not combine information about them
collected from other sources.
Most of the work in the literature, that studied users attitudes, focus on privacy
issue on specific contexts. Specifically, several studies addressed the analysis of
the privacy in e-commerce environments [55], the privacy of health information on
social media [78], the privacy that may affect individual’s purchasing decisions [75],
or the privacy that may be violated by the behavioral advertising [52]. The most
interesting part is the study of how different people value their own privacy and
what influence them. To evaluate users perception of risks, behaviors, concerns and




and technical differences [27,31,69,73] may influence users’ behaviors and attitudes
toward privacy. There are study that aims at understand if these differences can
influence the willingness to disclose personal information [4, 34].
It can be claimed that users are concerned for their privacy, as many work have
found [22, 29, 33, 59, 76, 77]. Other studies show that privacy concerns influence
people’s willingness to disclose personal information to a Web site [23, 35]. But
when it comes to study the behaviors, the attitudes and actions that a user take
to protect against privacy violation, the dichotomy between privacy attitudes and
resultant behaviors [2, 6, 15] shows up.
Several studies show that user will more likely disclose personal information when
some benefits can be obtained in return [19,32,71].
Recent studies in the social area show concerns among (Facebook) users, their
strong negative association between privacy concerns and engagement (posting,
commenting and Like-ing of content [72]), their willingness to change privacy set-
tings [14, 45], even if, in a subsequent study [16] the authors discovered that due to
the constant modifications and alterations to the policy, many users (i.e., 65.7%)
are unaware of how their profiles are affected, and therefore, unaware of their per-
sonal privacy settings. Moreover, users feels not capable of correctly configure their
privacy settings, and call for new tools to protect privacy [44]. Even those that read
the privacy policies, do not understand them, and acts like they are reluctant when
adopting privacy protective techniques and technologies [2, 17, 38] because they do
not understand them.
Most of the reported studies explored differences in individuals in respect to their
privacy concerns. Our goal in this work was to investigate concerns about the privacy
of two groups of students from different academic areas and with different techno-
logical knowledge. We explored whether educating them about potential risks on
the Web, through a direct learning from one’s behavior during online activities, may
involve an increasing awareness about privacy as well as an increasing willingness to
reduce their degree of exposure to privacy attacks.
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The study of the extent of privacy leakage, has to be conducted client-side. It is the
only way because we can’t study the mechanisms that goes inside an aggregator. In
this study, several workload were defined:
1. Workload for privacy leakage
2. Workload for performance
3. Workload for effectiveness
4. Workload for profile building
5. Workload for Awareness1
In all the experiments, excluded those regarding workload 2 and 5, the Fiddler
proxy was used to capture the traffic and study the privacy leakage. The proxy was
not used for workload 2 because we do not want to add the overhead due to the
proxy. It is not present in workload 6 too, because it involves human being and we
want to avoid two things:
• Make them perceive a slow connection (due to the proxy)
• Log and maintain a copy of their navigation2
3.1 Privacy Leakage study
This study analyze how personal and sensitive information are sent to third party
sites, such as third party Cookies, Referer header, Web bug, third party JavaScript or
advertisements. It explore the manners of leakage through which these information
are leaked. The capabilities of building users’ profile was tested and an extensive
study of the daisy chaining was conducted. Based on the leak found, we classify
the most popular threats for privacy and countermeasures to be provided by privacy
preserving tools. All the tools were compared for their performance and effectiveness.
In order to study the privacy leakage, we created an alter-ego that was registered
on several Web site. The Web site selected were chosen from 18 (sub)categories
of Alexa, including: Health, Travel, Employment, OSN, Arts, Relationships, News,
PhotoShare, Sports, Shopping, Games, Computer, Home, Kids_and_teens, Recre-
ation, Reference, Science, and Society. For each category the first top-10 Web sites
that allow users to register were selected.
1It was supplemented by 10 minutes of free Web navigation. See Chapter 4
2All the other data gathered and visualized during the test were deleted after the test ends
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Every created account was filled with all the possible information that the Web site
requests. For none of them was used the option to login using a third party account
(like Facebook or Google account). When available, the option “Remember me” was
used. The option could be used to study if private information are stored and then
sent to third party sites. The information of the alter ego that were diffuse incude
but are not limited to: full name, email address (required for all accounts), Date
Of Birth (DOB), Social Security Number (SSN), zip code, home address, personal
cellphone, school and general education information, sexual orientation, political and
intellectual beliefs, general interests (music, movies, and travel). They represent the
bits of private information that may be leaked towards 3rd-party sites.
A log of typical interactions between the user and the sites was created. We
included actions that may uniquely identify the users from (a) search terms3, (b)
browser habits, (c) preferences about music, movie and books4, and (d) the struc-
ture of their social networks [56]. We used the following six types of online users’
interactions:
1. Account Login and Navigation. We logged in on all 180 sites and analyzed
information leakage due to 3d-party cookies. We also visited 4 or 5 embedded links
per page, to reflect typical navigation of a user [40].
2. Viewing/Editing Profile. To reflect the most common actions performed by
users on OSN we analyzed the following actions: viewing one’s own profile and
editing it, viewing 5 friend’s profiles, writing on the “Timeline” of 2 of them.
3. Searching the Web for Sensitive Terms. We searched using google.com for 20
terms in 7 sensitive categories: Health (3), Travel (5), Jobs (2), Race and Ethnicity
(2), Religious beliefs (3), Philosophical and Political beliefs (4), Sexual orientation
(1). For each search term we also navigated through the first 2 search result pages.
4. Popular search. We chose 10 keywords from the top Google searches in 2012
and Google Trend Web pages5.
5. Inputting and Like-ing content. For Inputting content we analyzed the fol-
lowing actions: post and reply to questions on forums (2 actions), reply to dating
messages (1 action), upload pictures (1 action). For Like-ing content we analyzed the
following actions: “Like” on Facebook (2 actions), “Share” via Facebook (2 actions),
“+1” on Google Plus (2 actions), “Share” via Google Plus (2 actions).
During the tests, every HTTP request and response were logged. At the end of the
tests, the log were parsed to look for strings that match the personal and sensitive
information of the alter ego. False positive were removed by hand. Every occurred
leakage, were recorded with the piece of information leaked, the manner of leakage,
and the third party destinations.
Categorization of the most important leakages.
To draw up an order, a weight function for every leakage is needed. The function
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on the work of [39], we identified and classified the following leaked bits: Full name,
Email, Country, Region, City, Zip code, Employment, Gender, Age, Political and
religious beliefs.
Other leaked bit were identified there were not present in previous works: browser
fingerprint information, Sexual orientation, DOB, Interests (Movie and Mu-
sic), Education andIP address.
The categories of the leaked bits are based on the categorization discussed in the
aforementioned work, and are: High, Medium and Low, that reflects their degrees of
sensitivity and identifiability.
This study made several findings: the most important vehicles through which a
large amount of personal and sensitive information are leaked is the Referer HTTP
field, followed by Web bug.
Further, the 20% of first party sites leak personal and sensitive information to
third party sites.
Specifically, for the High Category, health terms are leaked in 3 of the 4 sites
studied. For the Medium Category we derived that an important bit leaked by a
number of sites was the user’s full name. This leakage raises concerns when this
bit is combined with sensitive terms. In Job and Travel searches, 4 out of 5, and
6 out of 7 of the analyzed sites show leakage. Surprisingly Health information are
leaked in almost all the visited Web sites. These information combined with user’s
personal information can create difficulties while seeking health insurance or lead to
privacy attacks such as identity theft6.
Figure 3.1: Distribution of privacy leakage vehicles across the categories.
A resume of the privacy bit leaked in show in Fig. 3.1. The privacy bits leaked
are categorized in Low, Medium, and High categories. The privacy bits that were
highlighted earlier, because their were not considered before, are highlighted in the
6http://www.job-hunt.org/privacy.shtml
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image too. The HTTP Referer field is always the most used vehicle to track users.
Only for the Low category we saw differences across all 6 manner of leakages.
3.1.1 Profile building
The goal of this section is to find if it possible for third party entities to rebuild
users’ profiles, and how hard it is, if possible.
To this aims, a special workload was designed (Workload 4). It was designed to
perform specific actions that would mimic the behavior of a user that easily disclose
personal information:
1. Logging into all 180 accounts
2. Viewing and editing all 10 profiles from the OSN category, post comments and
messages, share documents with “friends”
3. Search on all 10 shopping sites from the Shopping category, add items to
shopping carts (without payment), create lists, “Like” content
4. Search on all 10 Job-related sites from the Employment category, sign up for
email alerts
5. Search on all 10 Health sites from the Health category, post comments
6. Search on all 10 Travel sites from the Travel category, book travel arrangements
(without payment), visit Google maps site for itineraries, share with friends
(via email and OSNs)
7. Reply to messages on 5 out of 10 Web sites of the Relationships category, that
not required a Premium account
8. Create Photo Galleries on the photobucket.com Web site, upload images, add
comments, share with friends, “Like” content
9. Watch videos on the youtube.com Web site, post comments, share with friends,
“Like” content
10. Play songs on the last.fm Web site, post comments, share with friends, “Like”
content.
The browser was instrumented with Selenium, and all the interactions were logged.
No privacy preserving tools was used in this experiment to be sure to do not block
any leakage that could occurs. The logs were inspected to analyze if some personal
or sensitive information were being leaked to some third party entities, and what
fraction of a user’s profile is known by the top-10 aggregators.
The result show that a user’ profile could be easily build. From the network
traffic it was evident that specific bit of personal and sensitive information were
being leaked to third party aggregators, more precisely the top-10 leak recipients
identified in our data set are shown in Table 3.1. To analyze results the same
method of Section 3.1 was used. To better identify all the information that were
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currently being leaked, the set of strings to look for were enhanced to add other
sensitive terms used during the test. The string being added were abut: sensitive
Health terms (i.e., Pregnancy, Depression, Breast Cancer), Job terms (i.e., Analyst,
Senior Analyst in New York), Travel terms (i.e., traveling from Napoli Capodichino
to New York (JFK) and travel dates), music, book, and movie interests (i.e., Black
Eyed Peas, Internet Traffic Measurement, and Viva l’Italia movie).
Table 3.1: Building a profile from pieces of private and sensitive information.
Aggregator Email IP Country/ Zip Gender Age DOB Interests Health/ Religious/ Sex Known
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Table 3.1 show the details for each one of the top-10 aggregators. Surprisingly
Health terms were leaked to almost every aggregators. There are aggregators that
can achieve a very detailed profile about users, for example Google Analytics is the
top recipient of the leakages, being able to receive 87% of leaked bits.
These results prove that rebuild a users’ profile is an easy and trivial task for an
aggregators. They already posses all the information needed. Obviously, the use of
this data are unknown but it is a fact that users profile can be easily build, with
practically no big effort.
3.1.2 Daisy Chaining
The Daisy Chaining is a well known practice7 that can increase chances of building
detailed dossiers about users.
In Table 3.2 are presented information about Daisy Chaining. Column 2 shows
the first party sites contacted, columns 3 and 4 the third party aggregators involved
in daisy chaining while the last column shows the information leaked in that pro-
cess. Daisy chaining is identified by examining the HTML body which includes
an IFRAME that automatically triggers a request to the first aggregator. The ag-
gregator’s response includes a JavaScript file which triggers a request to the second
aggregator. Linkage between the aggregators can be seen also via the Referer header.
3.2 Tools Comparison
In this section several tools were compared: AdBlock Plus, NoScript, Ghostery,
RequestPolicy, and NoTrace. First, their functionalities and main characteristics





Table 3.2: Leakage of private information through daisy chaining.
Count/ Daisy Chaining Bits leaked
1st party sites First Aggregator Second Aggregator (Family)
1 / www.bebo.com bluecava.com addvisor.net (Targus Info) Name, Zip code
1 / www.bebo.com bluecava.com e.nexac.com (Datalogix) Name, Zip code
2 / barnesandnoble.com doubleclick.net 2mdn.net (Google) Gender
1 / gamespot.com doubleclick.net 2mdn.net (Google) Gender
2 / youtube.com doubleclick.net googlesyndication.com (Google) Gender
3 / www.datehookup.com doubleclick.net pubmatic.com (Pubmatic) IP Address
2 / www.datehookup.com doubleclick.net criteo.net (Criteo) IP Address
1 / it.bab.la adv.adsbwm.com bid.openx.net (openX) Ethnicity
1 / travelocity.com doubleclick.net yieldmanager.com (Yahoo!) Travel schedule
1 / www.espncricinfo.com doubleclick.net 2mdn.net (Google) City
1 / www.youtube.com doubleclick.net 2mdn.net (Google) Age, Gender
1 / www.linkedin.com doubleclick.net 2mdn.net (Google) Zip code, Gender
provide functionalities to filter advertisements and to block third party requests.
Table 3.4 highlights the lack of awareness in almost all the compared tools.
Table 3.3: Summary of supported functionalities.
Tool Header 3rd party Flash Web HTML5 Opt-out 3rd party Ads 3rd party
Removal cookies cookies bugs Local Storage cookies requests script execution
NoTrace




√ √ √ √
AdBlock Plus − − − ∼a − −
√ √ √
NoScript − − − ∼a − −
√ √ √
RequestPolicy − − − ∼a − −
√ √ √
aThis threat may be blocked as consequence of the application of other functionalities
Table 3.4: Summary of the main properties of the tested privacy tools.
Tool
Awareness Crowdsourcing Blocking
Configuration propertiesBlocked Data filtering methods
URLs leakage rules
NoTrace √ √ √
URL Configuration: Checkbox to activate/deactivate tech-
niques




Configuration: Loading of subscription lists√
−
√
URL Extra Step: Adding on-the-fly new regular expressions




Configuration: Checkbox to activate or deactivate tech-
niques, block/unblock ad-companies
Extra Step: Selectively block a specific ad-company
NoScript −
Configuration: Checkbox to activate or deactivate tech-
niques√
− URL Extra Step: Whitelist, Blacklist and Embedding Objects
to configure (temporarily or permanently)
RequestPolicy −
Configuration: Loading cross-site whitelists√
− URL Extra Step: Add pairs of domains for which requests are
allowed. Selectively enable/disable filtering on-the-fly
for a Web site
All the tools were comparable in terms of functionalities: filter ads and to block
third party requests. A subset of them support techniques for HTTP removal, 3d-
party and Opt-out cookie blocking, HTML5 Local Storage managing and Web bug
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filtering. The compared tools rely on the canonical URL-based blocking mechanism.
Only one tool seems to support other mechanism, to inspect the HTTP stream to
look for unwanted content, NoTrace (see Table 3.4)
The study cover the performance intended as users’ perceived experience and
performance (Section 3.2.1) and the effectiveness of the tested tools in terms of false
positives and false negatives due to the filtering rules (Section 3.2.2).
Moreover the test done in Section 3.1 were repeated using each one of the tools
described before. Several tools still leak personal and sensitive information. Specif-
ically Noscript and RequestPolicy still leak few information while Ghostery leak
more information. AdBLock Plus still have some leakage only through the Header,
it still leak sensitive information while NoTrace limit more efficiently the information
leakage. Plus NoTrace seems to be the only tool to offer an awareness mechanisms.
3.2.1 Performance
The workload for the performance test (Workload 2) was based on the methodology
of Krishnamurthy et al. [38], and consisted of the top-100 Web sites from 15 Alexa
categories (http://www.alexa.com). The Firefox browser was augmented by the
Pagestats extension (http://www.cs.wpi.edu/~cew/pagestats).
The tests were done with no privacy enhancing tools installed (’NoAddons’ con-
figuration), and then with one tool installed at turn. Different Firefox profiles were
created, one for each privacy protecting tools.
Response time results
One of the metric used to value the performance of privacy tools, was the mean
response time when applying the filtering capabilities on the data set.
Further, the gain in terms of response time when third party objects are being
removed was measured by comparing the time to retrieve an object from a page
when filtering is applied, against objects’ retrieve under normal conditions (i.e., the
“NoAddons” configuration).
It is clear from Figure 3.2 that three tools and specifically NoTrace, AdBlok Plus
and Ghostery show similar behavior (NoTrace seems to have slightly better results).
But they all seems to have a greater response time when compared with NoScript
and RequestPolicy (overhead of almost 600ms for both).
The main reason for these results is that NoScript and RequestPolicy are faster
because of the large number of resources blocked via their filtering rules. Without a
customized configuration NoScript blocks, regardless of the real danger of detected
objects, all JavaScript code, even those that are essential to the correct behavior of
the pages. RequestPolicy posses a stricter set of rules, it avoid the page break for
very popular Web pages only because they are included by default in the startup
whitelist. More details about this explanation could be find in Section 3.2.2.
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Figure 3.2: CDF of Response Time for each tools.
Browser performance results
This section explores the performance of single tools in terms of consumed mem-
ory when loading add-ons with specific techniques (i.e., ads and Web bugs filtering,
3d-party JS code execution blocking, opting-out from the tracking performed by
ad-networks, HTTP Referer blocking). Furthermore a test of Firefox performance
when multiple add-ons are installed is performed. Firefox is used with up to 8 ex-
tensions (i.e., AdBlock Plus, NoScript, Ghostery, RequestPolicy, Taco, RefControl,
PrivacyChoice and TrackMeNot). The second test is necessary because most of the
tools partially address the problem of privacy leak and it is already know that the
Firefox browser could incur in slowdown when multiple extensions are loaded8.
AdBlock Plus starts with the highest allocated memory since it needs to load in
memory the subscription list. Ghostery shows worse performance since the resident
memory at the end of the experiment was 4 times higher than the startup value.
Finally, NoScript and RequestPolicy show better memory consumption values due
to the high number of blocked resources.
In this case NoTrace is used as a way to provide “all in one” functionality. The
results showed a higher Firefox loading time for the multiple-installations (1260ms
vs 360ms for NoTrace).
Memory footprint was also analyzed, both when multiple add-ons are loaded then
when single add-on is loaded. To mimic several hours of Web browsing, the Mem-
Bench script9 was used.It is a browser benchmark that open 150 popular Web sites,
one per tab, sequentially.
Memory usage was taken when Firefox starts, when all the pages were loaded (final
allocated) and after all the tabs were closed (resident memory consumption). The
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of Firefox. When multiple add-ons were installed, the Firefox memory consumption
were 2.8x larger than NoTrace installation.
A last test regarding the multiple installations memory consumption was done.
The hypothesis is that more tools will imply a larger consumption of the mem-
ory. The final allocated memory for the NoTrace single installation was 120MB
while the memory allocated by three add-ons (i.e., NoTrace, AdBlock Plus, and
Ghostery) involved an increase of the value of the not released memory up to 300
MB. RequestPolicy and NoScript were not tested, since the amount of the resident
and final allocated memory drastically decreased, due to the number of resources
that they block and not because of better performance. The use of NoTrace alone
can save on average 60% of the memory.
3.2.2 Effectiveness
The metric to measure the effectiveness of a privacy enhancing tool, was the number
of correct blocked objects. In order to derive this metric, a manual analysis of
each single URLs was needed, to look for false positive (FP) and false negative
(FN). Because of the manual work, a different workload was used (Workload 3) that
contains only 10 Web sites from the news category of Alexa.com This work has been
done for each one of the compared tools.
In Table 3.5 are showed both FP and FN. Column 7 shows the number of FP
detected when applying intelligent filtering (i.e., IF in Table 3.5) and without con-
sidering domains that serve their content for first party sites (i.e., NoIF).
Table 3.5: Effectiveness on popular Web sites: FP and FN.
Web Site Web site’s CDNs
AdBlock Plus Ghostery NoTrace NoScript RequestPolicy
FP FN FP FN FP (IF/NoIF) FN FP FN FP FN
news.yahoo.com yimg.com 1 10 10 3 0/10 0 10 17 9 23
edition.cnn.com turner.com 0 34 1 12 0/3 2 21 14 1 26
weather.com imwx.com 3 7 5 20 0/29 16 36 7 16 18
reddit.com redditmedia.com 3 3 2 8 0/2 3 5 2 24 1redditstatic.com
my.yahoo.com yimg.com 3 5 3 9 0/2 7 2 10 4 4yahoapis.com
bbc.co.uk/news bbcimg.co.uk 1 8 0 11 0/14 5 36 6 106 3bbci.co.uk
foxnews.com fncstatic.com 8 6 1 18 0/35 2 49 8 63 2
nytimes.com nyt.com 1 11 0 12 0/7 10 48 17 63 20
huffingtonpost.com huffpost.com 1 23 1 7 0/4 6 21 4 42 1
guardian.co.uk guim.co.uk 5 10 4 5 0/3 8 26 5 119 1
Total 26 117 27 105 1/109 59 254 90 447 198
Recall/Precision 0.93/0.77 0.89/0.74 1.00/0.86 0.66/0.79 0.60/0.81
While NoTrace FP are avoided, FN are still present. They can be due to:
1. First party requests for resources that are not available in the DOM
2. Objects served by CDNs of first party sites
3. 3d-party requests for resources that are not available in the DOM
The first category includes requests for Web bugs (i.e., us.bc.yahoo.com/b). No-
Trace is not able to block them, as its technique to filter Web bugs looks at the
height and weight properties of the images available in the DOM of the requested
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Web page. Similar to AdBlock Plus, we allow users to add an ad-hoc filtering rule
to block them.
The second category includes errors due to the inclusion of the CDN servers into
the whitelist because of their role in serving needed content for the requested Web
pages. turner.com is a well know CDN for cnn.com10.
The third category includes errors due to third party requests for resources not
available in the DOM. Here, the high number of errors is due to a request for a
JS code that loads a certain number of both harmless scripts and malicious scripts
(13 out of 16 errors are Web bugs for the weather.com Web site). Removing the
loader will avoid all the FN but at the same time will break the page, because the
harmless script is used for page formatting and other proper site’s functionalities.
A solution could be adopted, but it will affects loading time. It consists to intercept
the request, analyze the URL, extract the harmful scripts rewrite the URL and then
resubmit the modified URL.
As anticipated in Section 3.2.1 and detailed in Table 3.5, NoScript and Request-
Policy exhibit the highest number of errors. To have a better understand of the
effectiveness of the tools, the number of FP and FN of the analyzed Web sites were
plotted. Fig. 3.3 shows NoTrace’s better behavior and the worst behavior of both
NoScript and RequesPolicy with an extremely high FP. Their high error rate is due
to naively blocking all third party requests, leaving users to adjust the filtering, by
whitelisting URLs, or disabling filtering on a specific site when the quality appears
degraded. Properly configuring the whitelist requires substantially more expertise
than an average user can reasonably be expected to have.






This section aims at understand behaviors, concerns and attitudes with particular
attentions to how all this characteristics are influenced by one’s skills. It also want
to finds if a highly customized privacy-enhancing tool can contribute to make users
aware of their privacy leakage. Specifically, in this study, we tried to respond to the
following questions:
1. Are there significant differences among two groups of students with regards
to beliefs, attitudes and concerns about privacy? (Online privacy concerns,
Section 4.2.1 for the results).
2. Experience in online activities and general technological knowledge can influ-
ence how different users “value” their privacy? (How skills influence behaviors,
Section 4.2.2 for the results).
3. Learning about privacy through the help of a privacy-enhancing tool can in-
volve more informed decisions about the countermeasures to adopt? Learning
can affect in the same way different types of groups? (How privacy awareness
can change behaviors, Section 4.2.3 for the results).
4.1.1 Methodology
For this experiment two samples of students were recruited from an university en-
vironment, specifically from the University of Salerno. The two samples consists
respectively of 18 students from the Computer Science department and 18 students
from the Cultural Heritage, Business and Law Departments. The sample of students
from Computer Science Department is named ICT Group, the other non-ICT. The
study was conducted at the ISIS research laboratory, at the University of Salerno.
It must be emphasized that these two groups are statistically different as we will
show afterwards in this Section 4.1 and 4.2.
The participation to the study was voluntary and anonymous, and students were
not compensated for taking part to the interviews. Further they were recruited
through email announcements to mailing lists, and word of mouth advertising. Par-
ticipants were informed that all the information they provided would remain confi-
dential. Finally, to avoid a biased sample, when recruited participants, we did not
mention privacy or security, privacy risks and benefits, and we only said that we
were looking for people interested in participating in an evaluation study.
Before proceed to the result of the experiment, some demographic information are
shown in Table 4.1. The average age of the sample was 24, and the gender split was
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almost even (i.e., 53% female and 47% male). The majority of participants spent
between two and six hours on Internet per day (72% of the non-ICT users and 50%
of ICT users), while only 11% of non-ICT users and half of ICT users spent on
Internet more than six hours. 83% of users in the non-ICT Group considers them-
selves incompetent with online activities, while 72% of ICT participants consider
themselves as competent/expert (χ=9.488, p-value=0.0065).
Table 4.1: Participant Demographics.
Variables non-ICT ICT Chi-Square
Group Group Sig. Level
Gender Male 28% 67% 0.0194
Female 72% 33%
Age
20-23 years 33% 44%
N.S.24-26 years 61% 50%
27-32 years 6% 6%
Education Bachelors 50% 11% 0.0113
Masters 50% 89%
Time spent 0-2 hours 17% 0%
0.0351online per day 2-6 hours 72% 50%
6+ 11% 50%
Internet Inexpert 83% 28%
0.0065Expertise Competent 17% 33%
Expert 0% 39%
4.1.2 Procedure




The preliminary survey consists of 32 questions in five categories, that aims to
collect the following information:
• demographic information (i.e., gender, age, education level)
• information about Internet usage
• general knowledge about privacy threats on the Web
• general attitudes toward privacy
• information about awareness and general behaviors about privacy online
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The first section consists of questions about demographics and skills (such as,
time spent on Internet and level of expertise with online activities). The second
regards knowledge about browser, and browser add-ons or extension. The third
part tested participants’ knowledge about some potential privacy threats on the
Web (rating on a 5-point Likert scale with strongly agree/strongly disagree as verbal
anchors). The fourth section tested participants’ concerns about privacy and general
attitudes toward online privacy (rating on a 5-point Likert scale). The last section
was designed to assess general participants’ behaviors about privacy online.
In the tool testing phase, we asked users to use a privacy enhancing tool designed
to provide awareness, namely NoTrace. The participants were asked to use the
evaluation tool, for a 30-minutes browsing session. Participants were free to use the
tool in any modalities, they were also provided with any details about the tool and
basic information on how to use it.
In order to not make participants feels uncomfortable they were not directly mon-
itored, but a person for every need was provided in case they did not understand
the instructions posed. The test was performed in an isolated environment within
our research lab in order to avoid distractions due to the presence of other people.
Furthermore, users were also encouraged to provide informal feedback for developers.
Before the third phase, users were asked to fill in the standard QUIS1 and CSUQ2
questionnaires. The aim was to provide additional information about system usabil-
ity and user satisfaction when using NoTrace and differences experienced by the two
tested groups. The questionnaires take less than 10 minutes. The two questionnaires
were adapted to the nature of the privacy enhancing tool. For the QUIS question-
naires, th questions have a rating on a 10-point scale with appropriate anchors at
each end (e.g., “Overall Reaction to the software: Terrible/Wonderful”), where small
values corresponded to unsatisfactory or negative responses and large values corre-
sponded to satisfactory results. The CSUQ questionnaires were composed by 12
questions, asking participants to indicate their agreement or disagreement through
a 7-point Likert scale with strongly agree and strongly disagree as verbal anchors.
In the third and final phase, participants were asked to fill in a summary ques-
tionnaire, composed of 12 questions. The questions have a rating on a 5-point Likert
scale with strongly agree/strongly disagree as verbal anchors. Three of them were
already present in the preliminary questionnaires. They are asked in the final phase
too to measure whether any change occurred in users’ opinions, habits or behav-
iors after gaining a greater awareness about certain activities performed online by
third party entities. The preliminary survey, the summary survey and the QUIS
and CSUQ questionnaires are publicly available3.
The entire experiment took between 60 and 70 minutes. Finally, for data analysis









The main objective of the first part of the study was to determine, for both samples,
beliefs and concerns about privacy, and to assess the knowledge of the threats that
could undermine the privacy during online activities.
Participants were interviewed about familiarities with some privacy threats. The
questions point to understand how much they are familiar with these threats. They
were asked specifically if they know terms such as “Web bug”, “Flash cookie”, “be-
havioral advertising” and provide a clear definition for them. We also asked them
whether they knew the risks associated with behavioral advertising.
The two groups showed differences, the non-ICT Group showed a small familiarity
with these privacy threats, very few of them were familiar with terms such as Web
bug, Flash cookie and behavioral advertising (5%, 11% and 33%, respectively). Only
28% of non-ICT users is aware of the risks of the behavioral advertising. Conversely,
the ICT Group reported greater familiarity for all privacy threats. We also found
statistical differences among groups, with corresponding results shown in Tale 4.2.
Relation among the familiarity with privacy threats and concern about privacy online
was found (question Q4 shown in Table 4.3). The analysis confirms that an increase
of familiarity would obviously decrease general privacy concerns (Pearson correlation
between privacy concern and familiarity with Flash cookie, behavioral advertising,
and behavioral advertising risks are -0.3883, -0.3434, -0.3607, p<.05, respectively).
Table 4.2: Familiarity with some privacy threats.
Variables non-ICT ICT Chi-Square
Group Group Sig. Level
Web bug Disagree 72% 22%
<0.0001Neutral 22% 0%
Agree 6 % 78%
Flash Cookie Disagree 61% 28%
0.00047Neutral 28% 0%
Agree 11% 72%
Behavioral Advertising Disagree 33% 0%
0.00012Neutral 34% 0%
Agree 33% 100%
Behavioral Advertising risks Disagree 33% 39%
0.00943Neutral 39% 0%
Agree 28% 61%
4.2.1 Online privacy concerns
Measures that have been used when examining privacy include: concerns about
privacy, attitudes toward privacy, privacy-related behavioral intentions and actual
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behaviors. We look at association with self-reported concerns about privacy in
everyday life (Q3), general concerns about privacy on Internet (Q4), as well as 2
questions related to the behavioral advertising (Q10 and Q11). These questions are
shown in detail in Table 4.3. It has to be emphasized that the question ID used in
here are the same used in the survey of the experiments.
The response of the participants show that all of them (in both groups) equally
consider the privacy very important in everyday life. We obtained different result
regarding privacy online. The ICT Group perceived privacy online with less concerns
(agreement for 50% of participants). There was no observable statistical difference
about privacy concerns across groups. Results are shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Participants privacy concerns. 5-Point Mean Likert scores. Groups are
not statistically different according to these metrics.
ID Question Mean Agreement
non-ICT ICT non-ICT ICT
Q3 I consider important the privacy in everyday
life
4.17 4.17 89% 83%
Q4 I am concerned about my privacy online 3.94 3.56 83% 50%
Q10 When I am online, I am aware that my brows-
ing information may be collected by a third
party for advertising purposes
3.28 3.94 67% 78%
Q11 I am comfortable with advertisers using my
browsing history to serve me relevant ads, as
long as that information cannot be tied to my
name or any other personal information
2.72 2.89 39% 44%
According to participants’ response, they are also concerned about tracking of
their movements on the Web, performed by large business companies in order to
provide them targeted advertising (Q10 and Q11 questions in Table 4.3). Although
aware that their browsing history may be collected for advertising purposes, more
than half of participants in both groups are uncomfortable even when their personal
information cannot be tied to their browsing history. Once again, no evidence of
statistical difference with regards to these concerns across groups were found.




Pragmatists [Personal Information Concerned] 28% 33%
Pragmatists [Behavioral Advertising Concerned] 22% 34%
Marginally Concerned 17% 11%
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In order to understand if it was possible to categorize students based on their pri-
vacy concern, the k-means [2,12] algorithms was used. For this study, two questions
strictly related to concerns about privacy (i.e., Q3 & Q4) and other two questions
related to the behavioral advertising privacy threat (i.e., Q10 & Q11) were selected.
By clustering our set of participants, we identified, in contrast to the results
by Westin [82] and Ackerman et al. [1], a group of Fundamentalists and a group
of Marginally Concerned, while the Pragmatists group was further decomposed in
two distinct groups whose privacy concerns focused either on the awareness of the
risks of the behavioral advertising phenomenon or on the linking of users’ history
information with personally identifiable information. This categorization results are
shown for both groups in Table 4.4.
More specifically, Fundamentalists users provided privacy-oriented responses to
all the questions selected for that analysis, showing their concerns to both beliefs
about privacy online and the risks of the behavioral advertising. Instead Marginally
Concerned users show general concerns about privacy and a propensity to enjoy
the benefits of the behavioral advertising but only if their personal information
are not being collected and linked with the browser’s history information. The
Pragmatists users, as anticipated, were organized in two distinct groups which we
called “Personal Information Concerned” and “Behavioral Advertising Concerned”
because of their major concerns about personally information and the risks of the
behavioral advertising, respectively.
Table 4.5: Participants privacy attitudes. 5-Point Mean Likert scores.






Q12 I am comfortable with the privacy I
have when I use search engines
2.39 2.44 17% 11% N.S.
Q13 It is my responsibility to protect my
personal information on the Web
3.17 2.61 44% 22% N.S.
Q14 I am aware of the tools that exist online
to help me protect my privacy online
3.17 4.33 55% 100% <0.001
Participants show to be uncomfortable with their search engines. Indeed when
interviewed about the comfortability of the privacy of their search engines, our
participants expressed their dissatisfaction (agreement of about 17% for the non-
ICT Group and only of 11% for the ICT Group, Q12 in Table 4.5). Intuitively,
this comfortability is related to concerns about privacy, as feelings of comfortability
increase one would expect overall privacy concern to decrease (Pearson correlation
r=-0.4497, p<.01).
Interestingly, participants stated that they are not personally responsible for pro-
tecting their online privacy (i.e., Q13, in Table 4.5), specifically 56% of users in the
non-ICT Group and 78% of ICT. But none of the participants do take actions to
effectively protect it (the whole non-ICT Group affirmed its inability to protect its
personal information, p-value=0.0004). Even if more than half of all participants are
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Table 4.6: Participants privacy attitudes.




Q23 If I have to prioritize
between perfect search
and perfect privacy I
would choose...
Perfect Search 11% 17%
N.S.
Search ahead of Privacy 28% 17%
Privacy ahead of Search 61% 61%
Perfect Privacy 0% 5%
Q24 If you knew for a fact that
topics you search for using a
search engine were saved
forever, would it change your
search habits?
No change 17% 11%
N.S.
Somewhat of a change 78% 77%
Significantly change 5% 11%
aware of tools that exist online to protect it (greater awareness for the ICT Group,
p-value=0.0002) almost no one ever installed one. In general, users say that they
care about privacy but they do not do anything about it.
When asked about their preferences about search engines and specifically when
asked to chose between search quality and search privacy, most of the users express
their preference for the Privacy ahead of Search option (rate of 61% for both groups,
see Table 4.6).
A further analysis to inspect the nature of privacy concerns were conducted by
analyzing the responses to the following question: “What are your main privacy
concerns online?”. By manual analyzing the response, five met-categories of concerns
were identified:
1. “Tracking my behaviors by third party entities”
2. “I am worried about making financial transactions online”
3. “Identity theft”
4. “Any unauthorized access to my personal information”
5. “Internet will never forget my personal data after their dissemination”
All the details for both groups are presented in Table 4.7. Because some answers
fall in two categories, the sum of columns is above 100%. Students from the non-ICT
Group seems to be less concerned about being tracked by third party entities. One
possible explanation is that they are aware of the presence of third party entities,
but do not know which information they are collecting. Instead students from the
ICT Group are more concerned about more general problems. The concerns about
Identity theft are almost the same across the groups, there is no statistical difference.
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Table 4.7: Nature of privacy concerns across the ICT and the non-ICT groups.
Meta-categories non-ICT ICT
Group Group
Tracking my behavior online from third party entities 44% 56%
I am worried about making financial transactions online 11% −
Identity theft 22% 28%
Any unauthorized access to my personal information − 17%
Internet will never forget my personal data after their dissemination − 11%
No answer 28% 33%
4.2.2 How skills influence behaviors
Some behaviors that could be indicative of a lack of privacy concern and that we
studied include:
1. Increasing security settings on browsers
2. Installing tools to protect privacy
3. Deleting cookie saved on browsers
4. Deleting cache and temporary Internet files
5. Reading licence and privacy agreements.
Regarding attitudes, the participants do not change their browser settings, or
install privacy tools (Q16 and Q18, Table 4.8), with differences between groups.
Only 17% of non-ICT and 61% of ICT participants regularly delete cookies. There
is no difference between about policy reading. More than 70% of participants in
both groups rarely/never read privacy policies (see Figure 4.1 and Table 4.8).
Statistical differences between groups were found too. Specifically differences
about the privacy behaviors. Significant differences across groups for “Deleting
HTTP cookie” (p-value=0.0045) and “Deleting Internet files” (i.e., 0.0229). Other
differences were find about “Changing browser privacy settings” and about “In-
stalling privacy tools”. There are correlation among these two actions and privacy
concerns (r=-0.3371, -0.3748, p<.05). There was no significant difference about pol-
icy readings. Furthermore users who report to be slightly concerned about privacy
online also report less engagement across the analyzed behaviors (see Figure 4.2).
From the study emerge that users of the non-ICT Group are less aware of the
tracking activities performed by large advertising companies and aggregators. They
do not know the privacy vehicles used to track users and finally, they are less aware
of the tools that exist to protect the privacy. Moreover, although aware that their
browsing history may be collected for advertising purposes, most of the participants
in both groups (61% of non-ICT and 56% of ICT users) are still uncomfortable,
even when their personal data cannot be tied to their browsing history.
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Figure 4.1: Privacy behaviors: deleting HTTP cookies, deleting Temporary Internet
files (cached resources), reading of Web sites’ privacy policies. Results
are shown for both groups.
Figure 4.2: Percentages of users reporting certain behaviors, grouped by level of
privacy concern.
The study showed the “lazy” attitude of non-ICT users, who mostly do not take
actions to protect their privacy. This situation highlight a huge need for support and
supporting tool for non-technical students (statistical results are shown in Table 4.8).
4.2.3 How Privacy awareness can change behaviors
Before discussing the results of the last part of the study, remind that students, in
this second phase of the experiment, were asked to use NoTrace during a 30-minutes
browsing session. At the end of the testing phase, we first collected information
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Table 4.8: Participant privacy actual behaviors.
ID Question Agreement Chi-Square
non-ICT ICT Sig. Level
Q16 Have you ever changed your browser privacy settings? 22% 78% 0.0022
Q18 Have you ever installed a tool to protect your privacy? 0% 28% 0.0159
Q26 Are you able to protect your personal information? 0% 61% <0.001
about users’ satisfaction and perceptions about the usability of the evaluation tool.
Second, we interviewed students in order to understand if NoTrace had some effect on
them, in terms of increased awareness and willingness to adopt any type of strategy
to improve privacy.
As we can see from Figure 4.3, on average, the posed questions were rated pos-
itively. Some lower values for the non-ICT users are relative to the complexity of
the experimented tool and the low intuitiveness of the used terminology. In general,
at the question “Overall, It was easy to use NoTrace” (Q27), 61% of non-ICT users
expressed their agreement against 94% of ICT ones (p-value=0.0177).
Figure 4.3: QUIS results. Comparison between non-ICT and ICT groups.
Additionally, the ICT Group responded with more positive results than the other
Group. The same trend is still valid for the analysis of results of the second ques-
tionnaire. Specifically, as we can see from Figure 4.4, “Satisfaction” and “Clearness”
are equally positively rated by both groups, while differences exists about easiness of
use and learning and tool’s usefulness. These results confirm that non-technological
users need more support, even to understand the usefulness of any tool to protect
privacy.
Finally, the reliability of the QUIS and CSUQ questionnaires were good (Cron-
bach’s α = 0, 91 and α = 0, 94, respectively).
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Figure 4.4: CSUQ results organized according to five metrics: Satisfaction, Easy of
Use and Learning, Usefulness and Clearness.
Now we are going to analyze results about the investigation of whether a privacy-
enhancing tool is able to impact on the users’ perceptions, beliefs and concerns
about privacy online. The question to respond is if learning about privacy through
NoTrace can involve more informed decisions about the countermeasures to adopt,
and if this learning affects, in the same way, both the analyzed groups.
We asked users to provide their thoughts about the concerns related to third party
We sites that access to their personal data and. If after using the tool, they were
willing to take actions to protect their privacy.
Results in Table 4.9 show positive ratings for both groups highlighting how the
tool was able to increase user awareness about the dangers of certain activities on
the Web. However, the higher positive result was for the question: “I consider
important the privacy and I want to make actions and use tools to protect it” with
agreement of 83% for non-ICT users and 72% of ICT users. Although all users rated
positively all three questions shown in Table 4.9, more willingness to change their
behavior online was expressed by non-ICT ones, even if there isn’t any statistically
difference.
From Figure 4.5 we can see that users who report to be slightly concerned about
privacy online also report less willingness to take actions to protect themselves
against privacy invasions. Another interesting result is about the high percentage
of “Neutral” users (neither concerned nor unconcerned about privacy online) who




Table 4.9: Participants privacy resultant behaviors. 5-Point Mean Likert scores.
ID Question Mean Agreement
non-ICT ICT non-ICT ICT
Q33 I am more conscious of the leakage of my
privacy on the Web and I want to change
my behavior to try to protect it
4.06 3.83 72% 78%
Q34 I consider important the privacy and I
want to make actions and use tools to pro-
tect it
4.11 3.94 83% 72%
Q35 Protecting my personal information means
that I am willing to reduce the information
I will post on the Web
3.72 3.61 67% 61%
It is worth to note that when interviewed about the possibility to reduce personal
information posted on the Web, and specifically on the Facebook.com Web site, the
agreement percentages, respect to the previous 2 questions (Q33 and Q34, Table 4.9),
dropped for both groups. Even concerned about privacy, users seem to not be
worried about the leakage of their personal information, when some benefits can
be obtained in return. Some reasons, in fact, output of open-ended text questions,
include: (a) “I need to add accurate information to OSNs to increase my visibility”,
(b) “I need to add accurate information to OSNs to find my old friends”, (c) “I am
comfortable with how much information I share, I have a control over my personal
information”.
The most important result of this part of the study is the comparative assessment
between some specific questions asked before and after the tool testing phase, in
order to evaluate if changes occurred in users’ opinions and habits after using a tool
to protect privacy. Questions are shown in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: Comparative assessment of questions posed before and after the testing
phase.
Question non-ICT ICT





I consider important the privacy
in everyday life
4.11 4.33 0.041 4.17 4.28 N.S.
I am concerned about my pri-
vacy online
3.94 4.44 0.024 3.61 3.89 N.S.
When I am online, I am aware
that my browsing information
may be collected by a third
party for advertising purposes
3.22 4.22 0.011 3.94 4.44 0.0459
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Figure 4.5: Percentages of users reporting final behaviors, grouped by level of privacy
concern.
When students were made informed about the potential harmful activities on the
Web, and have learned by the tool in which way their personal information were
leaked, they expressed increased concerns about risks to their privacy, especially
when their data are disclosed to third party sites.
In general, the tool allowed users to understand which personal and sensitive
information are being disclosed during their online activities, in which extent and
also, towards which third party sites. Support and awareness were able to involve
changes in users’ opinions, slightly increasing the level of concern about privacy in
everyday life (mean values: 4.11 vs. 4.33 for the non-ICT Group and 4.17 vs. 4.28 for
the ICT Group, Table 4.10) and mostly increasing concerns about the online privacy
for the non-ICT Group (3.94 vs. 4.44) and the awareness about third party tracking
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of attitudes before and after using NoTrace during the test-
ing phase.
(for both groups). In Figure 4.6 we can see how using the tool involved greater
concerns about privacy as well as a greater awareness about the tracking performed
by advertising companies. Additionally, statistically significant differences for all
questions exist only for the non-ICT users, highlighting, once again, the usefulness
of NoTrace mainly for users without technological skills (see Table 4.10). For ICT
users, instead, significant results are obtained only with regard to the awareness
of the tracking performed by advertising companies. Both groups increased their
awareness about the risks for their privacy related to the activities performed by





The analysis carried out showed that the extent of online privacy problems do not
have to be underestimated. There are companies that actually gather an enormous
amount of data about users and are able to build a detailed profile about them and
link these profiles with personal information to identify an individual. Users should
be aware that their data are disclosed and available to several companies, and that
these companies can easily build profiles about them. Moreover the final use of these
data is not fully known. These companies can voluntary on involuntary leak users’
profile to other entities, without users consent.
The study, for the first time, employed a methodology that was not the surface
crawling. This methodology reflects users’ online real behaviors and are not limited
by the surface crawling methodology. Therefore the results obtained are a precise
snapshot of the current situation and not just a resume of potential privacy leakage.
They reflects real privacy issues that the average user can face while online. We find
that aggregators are able, at least, to easily rebuild users’ profile. By using reverse
engineering it was possible to show the amount of information leaked to each one
of the top-10 aggregators. The profile rebuilding did not used any data mining
technologies or other sophisticated techniques, it was based on simple observation of
the network traffics. The most incredibly result is that one of the top-10 aggregator
is able to collect 87% of a user’s private information. Moreover parts of these data are
exchanged between aggregators, trough the well-know practice of Daisy Chaining.
Private bit like Name, Zip code, Gender and Travel schedule are passed from one
aggregator to another in plaintext. While the number of HTTP request accounting
for the daisy chaining are very low, they carry really important information.
Moreover while the capabilities of aggregtors to derive users’ profile is increasing,
the techniques available to users to protect themselves are not advancing at the same
speed. There are a lot of tools that help to prevent users from unintentionally disclose
personal and sensitive information. Anyway, almost none of them is able to make
users aware of the hidden micro-transactions of personal and sensitive information
that effectively pay for apparently free services.
Furthermore, the evaluation study about users behaviors, concerns, and attitudes
supports the thesis that an increased awareness can be achieved. It has been demon-
strated that one simple and effective way to increase awareness of users, is to simply
show them the leaked information. It helps users to have a better perception of
what goes underneath while they are on the Web, and make them capable of decide
whenever to apply countermeasures. Showing to users the information that they
actually leak during online activities, really increased their awareness.
While learning from one’s behavior and awareness increase the users’ willingness
to change their behaviors online, their unwillingness to withhold information mainly
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on social network sites, remains. But users are now aware that what they do online,
is monitored and possible used to profile them.
The findings so far are:
• All participant students consider equally important privacy in everyday life,
with no statistical differences based on skills
• That non-ICT students seems to be more concerned about risks to their pri-
vacy online
• Skills do influence attitudes. Indeed non-ICT students exhibit a little willing-
ness to adopt privacy preserving technologies
• Both groups show the same behaviors about Web sites’ policies.
Despite the increased awareness, users’ need to generously provide an ever-increasing
number of personal information is still prominent. It have to be emphasized that
this study has some limitations. First, all participants at our study were students
from an Italian academic environment. The samples were composed of users with
high education levels and with an age ranging from 20 to 30 years. Therefore, the
results may not necessarily be representative of the entire world population.
Future work could look into privacy attitudes and behaviors with regard to older
age groups, students from other academic areas and with even more diversified
technological skills. Moreover, a larger number of subjects would provide more
statistically significant results.
The study prove that there are tools that help to make users aware of the risks
they face during their normal online activities. More importantly, we verify that
such capable tools influence users’ concerns (with no difference due to skills) about
the risks of behavioral advertising. It also raises general concerns about privacy,
especially for non-ICT students.
Attitudes are largely affected by tools that increase users’ privacy awareness, es-
pecially for non-ICT students. Usually non-ICT students are regretful to install
and use privacy protection tools, mainly because of their low technical skills. They
feels inadequate and inexperienced and do not want to spend time on a tool when
they feel inexpert.
In conclusion, users expose their personal sensitive information while on the Web,
mainly because of third party companies called aggregators that gather, collect and
link these information to enhance the behavior advertising practice. The aforemen-
tioned aggregators can easily build profiles about users, that include their personal
information and their interests. Users are fairly aware of this ecosystem, they do
not know how their data can be used. To make users more aware of the online pri-
vacy risks, a tools that show what information is leaked to who was used. A better
awareness was achieved thanks to the tool. A change in concerns and attitude was
observed, with non-ICT students being more affected by the increased awareness.
This confirms the need for more support, and tools, for users who do care about
privacy but are not aware of the risks they encounter during their online activities
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